Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Advertiser Competition and Gatekeeping in Ad-Funded Media
Author-Name: Martin Peitz
Author-Email: Martin.Peitz@gmail.com
Author-Name: Anton Sobolev
Author-Email: anton.sobolev@uni-mannheim.de
Author-Name: Paul Wegener
Author-Email: pwegener@mail.uni-mannheim.de

  
Classification-JEL:  L12, L13, L15, M37
Keywords: gatekeeper, ad-funded media, advertiser competition, ad blocking, uniform pricing, foreclosure, imperfect competition


Abstract:
Advertisers place ads on publishers’ websites to attract the attention of multihoming consumers. Because of competition in the product market, advertisers may
have an incentive to partially or fully foreclose their rivals. A gatekeeper may be able
to limit publishers’ access to some of the consumers. We fully characterize the equilibrium in which the gatekeeper, publishers, and advertisers make strategic pricing
decisions. We show how the presence of the gatekeeper affects the advertisers’ foreclosure decisions and the surplus of the different market participants.
Note: 
Length: 57
Creation-Date: 2026-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp731
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_731