Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Innovation in EU Merger Control: Theories of Harm and Efficiencies
Author-Name: Martin Peitz
Author-Email: martin.peitz@gmail.com


Classification-JEL: K21, L40, L41
Keywords: EU merger control, innovation theories of harm, innovation efficiencies, start-up acquisitions, EU Merger
Guidelines

Abstract: Innovation and the diffusion of new technologies are central to consumer welfare in dynamic markets. On
the one hand, mergers may harm innovation by removing independent innovation paths, restricting access
to key inputs for innovation, or weakening incentives to adopt and diffuse new technologies. On the other
hand, mergers may generate innovation efficiencies when they combine complementary tangible and
intangible assets. This article discusses how the revised EU Merger Guidelines should evaluate these
opposing forces and proposes a structured approach to assessing innovation harms and efficiencies while
ensuring that merger control remains focused on effective competition and consumer welfare.

Note: 
Length:7
Creation-Date:2026-03
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp741
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_741