Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title:				An analysis of the German university admissions system
Author-Name: 			Alexander Westkamp
Author-Email:			awest@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL:	C78, D02
Keywords:		University Admissions; Matching; Stability; Strategyproofness; Complex Constraints
Abstract:		This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information 
				equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} 
				of the German system. I introduce \emph{matching problems with complex constraints} and the notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two 
				simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. 
				n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently 
				employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.
Length:	53
Creation date:		2012-03
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse02_2012.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse02_2012