Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Consistency and Communication in Committees
Author-Name: Inga Deimen
Author-Email: ideimen@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Felix Ketelaar
Author-Email: 3fekete@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Mark T. Le Quement
Author-Email: mlequem@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D72, D82, D83
Keywords:  Communication, Committees, Voting

Abstract: 	This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication
		in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical 
		Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that 
		captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result 
		shown by Coughlan (2000) for the classical model, full pooling of 
		information followed by sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model 
		for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex 
		post conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption 
		of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and sufficient 
		conditions for the implementability of the first best decision rule via 
		truthful equilibria.

Note: 
Length: 31
Creation-Date: 2013-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse02_2013.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse02_2013