Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Expectation-Based Loss Aversion and Strategic Interaction
Author-Name: Simon Dato
Author-Email: simdato@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Andreas Grunewald
Author-Email: gruni@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Daniel Müller
Author-Email: daniel.mueller@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, D01, D03, D81
Keywords: Non-Cooperative Games, Expectation-Based Loss Aversion, Reference-Dependent Preferences, Mixed Strategies

Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion.
First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Koszegi and Rabin 
(2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to derive equilibria. Second, we delineate how expectation-based 
loss-averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected-utility preferences. 
Third, we analyze equilibrium play under expectation-based loss aversion and comment on the existence of equilibria.

Note: 
Length: 42
Creation-Date: 2016-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse02_2016.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse02_2016