Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Bundling Public with Private Goods
Author-Name: Gerrit Frackenpohl
Author-Email:gerrit.frackenpohl@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Gert Pönitzsch
Author-Email:gert.poenitzsch@ifw-kiel.de
Classification-JEL: C91, D12, H41
Keywords:  Public Goods, Bundling, Valuation, Superadditivity

Abstract: 	We propose a simple mechanism that might improve 
voluntary contributions to public goods. Using a 
laboratory experiment we analyze how bundling public with 
private goods affects individuals' valuations for both 
goods. In the experiment, subjects may purchase a private 
and a public good either separately or in the form of a 
bundle. The data show superadditivity for bundles of 
public and private goods, i.e., the willingness to pay for 
the bundle exceeds the willingness to pay for the two 
separate goods. In contrast, we find no superadditivity in 
control treatments with only private goods. We discuss 
several behavioral concepts which are in line with our 
results as well as implications for fundraisers and firms.

Note: 
Length: 37
Creation-Date: 2013-05
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse05_2013.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse05_2013