Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Overbidding in Fixed Rate Tenders - An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Explanations
Author-Name: Dieter Nautz
Author-Name: Jörg Oechssler
Author-Email: oechssler@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: E52, D44
Keywords: Overbidding, repo auctions, monetary policy instruments of the European Central Bank
Abstract:  This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both 
	the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the 
	ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.
Note: 
Length: 18
Creation-Date: 2003-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse10_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse10_2003