Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Curbing Power or Progress? Governing with an Opposition Veto
Author-Name: Albrecht Morgenstern
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: A12, D72, D78, H11
Keywords: Political Accountability, Opposition, Veto, Divided Government
Abstract: Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests 
	(e.g. \divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the 
	government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends 
	on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial 
	only if the government's special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about 
	(re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence 
	of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better. 
Note: 
Length: 42
Creation-Date: 2004-06	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse10_2004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse10_2004