Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales
Author-Name: Christina Matzke, Benedikt Wirth
Author-Email: christina.matzke@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C61, C62, C79
Keywords: bounded rationality, social learning, population game, mean dynamic
Abstract: In our model, individual consumers follow simple behavioral
	decision rules based on imitation and habit as suggested in
	consumer research, social learning, and related fields. Demand
	can be viewed as the outcome of a population game whose revision
	protocol is determined by the consumers' behavioral rules. The
	consumer dynamics are then analyzed in order to explore the
	demand side 	and first implications for a strategic supply side.
Note: 
Length: 23
Creation-Date: 2008-05
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse10_2008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse10_2008