Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society
Author-Name: Sebastian Kranz
Author-Email: skranz@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: A13, C7, D02, D63, D64, D71, D8, Z13
Keywords: moral norms, social preferences, fairness,
	reciprocity, rule utilitarianism, voting-by-feet,
	farsighted-stability, cultural evolution, golden rule,
	social norms
Abstract: This paper analyses competition of moral norms and
	institutions in a society where a fixed share of people
	unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining
	people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier
	or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet
	shows that those norms and institutions arise that
	maximize expected utility of norm-compliers, taken into
	account selfish players' behavior. Such complier optimal
	norms lead to a simple behavioral model that, when
	combined with preferences for equitable outcomes, is in
	line with the relevant stylized facts from a wide range of
	economic experiments, like reciprocal behavior, costly
	punishment, the role of intentions, giving in dictator
	games and concerns for social efficiency. The paper
	contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet,
	institutional design, ethics and social preferences.
Note: 
Length: 40
Creation-Date: 2006-05	
Revision-Date: 2006-06
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse11_2006.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse11_2006