Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction
Author-Name: Andreas Roider
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: D23, D82, L14, L22 
Keywords: Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments 
Abstract: In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts 
	interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and 
	hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide 
	conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the 
	foundation of the property-rights theory: I characterize under which circumstances its 
	predictions are correct when trade is contractible. Second, I study how the optimal use of 
	the incentive instruments depends on the environment. This is in the spirit of the 
	multitasking literature. Finally, the model produces implications of the property-rights 
	theory that are empirically testable.

Note: 
Length: 29
Creation-Date: 2002-05	
Revision-Date: 2003-05
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse12_2002.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2002