Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Sandbagging 
Author-Name: Matthias Kräkel
Author-Email: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, D72
Keywords: ecoordination problem, dynamic contest, heterogeneous contestants,
	withholding e¤ort
Abstract: 	Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the
	rules of the game by systematically withholding e¤ort in the beginning.
	Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con-
	test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of
	high-ability participants in the first period. Such sandbagging can be ben-
	eficial to avoid second-period matches against other high-ability opponents.
	I characterize the conditions under which sandbagging leads to a coordina-
	tion problem, similar to that of the battle-of-the sexes game. Moreover, if
	players' abilities have a stronger impact on the outcome of the first-period
	contest than e¤ort choices, mutual sandbagging by all high-ability players
	can arise.
Note: 
Length: 22
Creation-Date: 2011-11
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse12_2011.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2012