Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Author-Name: Philippe Raab
Author-Name: Burkhard C. Schipper
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C72, C91, C92, D21, D23, D43, L13, L22, M52
Keywords: unitary player assumption, experiments, group behavior, theory of the firm
Abstract: In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal 
	organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation 
	suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot 
	competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that teams and individuals are behaviorally 
	equivalent providing a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this 
	assumption is robust in experiments in contrast to analog experimental results on price-competition in the literature. 
Note: 
Length: 30
Creation-Date: 2004-07	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse13_2004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse13_2004