Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game
Author-Name: Attila Tasnadi
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: E24, J41
Keywords: Unemployment, Bertrand-Edgeworth, wage-setting games
Abstract: We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous
	productivity, that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We 
	show that equilibrium unemployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result 
	in full employment. 
Note: 
Length: 23
Creation-Date: 2003-07
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse14_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2003