Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium
Author-Name: Lars Koch
Author-Email: lars.koch@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, D80
Keywords: 
Dynamic Stability, Noncooperative Games, Correlated Equilibrium, Evolution
Abstract: We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash
equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex
	monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents
	receive signals and condition the choice of strategies
	on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is
	asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict
	(correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated
	equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically
	stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it
	is shown that if signals are endogenous but no player has
	an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process
	and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically
	stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict
	Nash equilibrium.
Note: 
Length: 30
Creation-Date: 2008-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse14_2008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2008