Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Regulation under Financial Constraints
Author-Name: Axel Gautier
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: D82, H42, L51
Keywords: Regulation, Asymmetric information, Monopolist
Abstract: This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. The originality of the paper is to consider that the regulator faces a 
	cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the 
	regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two-part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a 
	fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost. 
Note: 
Length: 12
Creation-Date: 2002-06	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse16_2002.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse16_2002