Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Delegation and Strategic Compensation in Tournaments
Author-Name: Matthias Kräkel
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 
Abstract: This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as
	incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their
	managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric equilibria, however, one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative weight. 
Note: 
Length: 21
Creation-Date: 2000-12
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse17_2000.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse17_2000