Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption
Author-Name: Klaus Abbink
Classification-JEL: C91, D62, D72, D73, K42
Keywords: Corruption, reciprocity, fairness, public sector salaries
Abstract: In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that
	distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public
	officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers
	whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent
	difference in behaviour.
Note: 
Length: 
Creation-Date: 2000-03
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse1_2000.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse1_2000