Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: An experimental test of career concerns
Author-Name: Alexander K. Koch
Author-Name: Albrecht Morgenstern
Author-Name: Philippe Raab
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C91, D83, L14 
Keywords:  incentives, reputation, career concerns, signal jamming, experiments
Abstract:  Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the 
	analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires 
	players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate 
	real-life decision makers’ behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult 
	since typically little is known about the information that individuals base their 
	decisions on, and this explains the dearth of empirical studies. We provide experimental 
	evidence that the signal jamming mechanism works in a laboratory setting. Moreover, 
	subjects’ beliefs fit remarkably well requirements imposed by the Bayesian equilibrium 
	concept.
Note: 
Length: 28
Creation-Date: 2004-11	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse20_2004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse20_2004