Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Collusion via Resale
Author-Name: Thomas Tröger
Author-Email: ttroeger@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Rodney Garratt
Author-Name: Charles Zheng
Classification-JEL: D44
Keywords: English auction, resale, collusion
Abstract: The English auction is susceptible to tacit
	collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is
	allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria
	where, with positive probability, one bidder wins
	the auction without any competition and divides the
	spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other
	bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dominate
	(among bidders) the standard value-bidding
	equilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make
	any commitment on bidding behavior or post-bidding
	spoil-division.
Note: 
Length: 47
Creation-Date: 2008-10
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse20_2008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse20_2008