Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model
Author-Name: Rolf Tisljar
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C72, D82
Keywords: equilibrium refinement, infinite signaling game, informed principal, mechanism design, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, principle of inscrutability, revelation principle, strong solution
Abstract: We present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional 
	private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian 
	equilibria. Furthermore, we present several equilibrium refinements based on the concept of equilibrium domination to take account of beliefs off the 
	equilibrium path. Finally, we demonstrate that the extension of the strong solution of Myerson (Econometrica, 1983) to our model is supported as an 
	equilibrium satisfying all refinement criteria presented (in case a strong solution exists). 
Note: 
Length: 51
Creation-Date: 2002-09	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse21_2002.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse21_2002