Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents
Author-Name: Peter-J. Jost
Author-Name: Matthias Kräkel
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: J3, M12, M5 
Keywords:  preemption, tournaments
Abstract:  Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments 
	are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move 
	tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a 
	sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or 
	a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a 
	preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to 
	prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts 
	although the agents are risk neutral.
Note: 
Length: 36
Creation-Date: 2004-11	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse21_2004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse21_2004