Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap
Author-Name: Georg Nöldeke
Author-Name: Larry Samuelson
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C72, D82
Keywords: sexual selection, handicap principle, signaling equilibrium, net viability
Abstract: We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are 
	concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We 
	identify circumstances in which a signaling equilibrium would require high-quality males to send signals so much larger than those of 
	males in lower quality (to deter mimicry by the latter) as to yield lower net viabilities for the former. This causes females to shun males 
	who send large signals, ensuring that there is no signaling equilibrium. 
Note: 
Length: 12
Creation-Date: 2001-09	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse22_2001.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse22_2001