Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Strategic The Two-Person Harvard Game: An Experimental Analysis 
Author-Name: Jose Apesteguia 
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C72, C92, D83 
Keywords: Bounded rationality; Psychology; Melioration; Nash equilibrium; Information; Learning 
Abstract: Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of 
	previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs exclusive choice of B is a better strategy. The equilibrium 
	predicted by the theory of melioration is to exclusively play A, while the Nash equilibrium is to almost exclusively play B. The predictive values of such equilibria are analyzed under 
	three different informational conditions. Special attention is paid to the learning processes exhibited by players. 
Note: 
Length: 26
Creation-Date: 2001-10	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse23_2001.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2001