Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Incomplete and Asymmetric Surplus Information in Labor Relations
Author-Name: Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Author-Name: Bettina Rockenbach
Author-Name: Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C92, D82, J41
Keywords: trust, reciprocity, efficiency, incomplete information, asymmetric information
Abstract: Numerous laboratory experiments show that workers reciprocate to high wages with high effort, when there is perfect information on the surplus created. 
	Recent field experiments, however, suggest that trust and reciprocity may be lower or absent when the information is incomplete. We report a laboratory 
	experiment with symmetric and asymmetric incomplete surplus information in a “bilateral gift exchange” setting. We find that trust and reciprocity have a 
	significant positive effect on wages, effort and efficiency. But, all three are substantially lower under incomplete than under complete information. The negative 
	impact on wages and efficiency is even greater with information asymmetry. 
Note: 
Length: 26
Creation-Date: 2003-10	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse24_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse24_2003