Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known
Author-Name: Thomas Tröger
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: D44 
Keywords: asymmetric first-price auctions, resale, effciency 
Abstract: We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. 
	Such auctions induce an ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where 
	the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser, increases (reduces) 
	the ineffciency of the market when the buyer with the commonly known value is weak (strong).
	Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue.
Note: 
Length: 27
Creation-Date: 2004-09	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse25_2004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse25_2004