Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly
Author-Name: Pradeep Dubey
Author-Name: Dieter Sondermann
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C72, D41, D42, D44, D61
Keywords: Limitorders, doubleauction, Nashequilibria, Walras equilibria,perfectcompetition,bilateralmonopoly, mechanism design
Abstract:  We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) 
	allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular, Nash equilibria are 
	Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly. 
Note: 
Length: 24
Creation-Date: 2003-11	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse26_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse26_2003