Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Aggressiveness and Redistribution
Author-Name: Dieter Bös
Author-Name: Martin Kolmar
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: D23, D30, D74
Keywords: Anarchy, Contests, Redistribution
Abstract: In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a 
	common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of 
	the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs 
	voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy 
	in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market. 
Note: 
Length: 23
Creation-Date: 2003-01	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse2_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse2_2003