Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Law and Economics of Obligations
Author-Name: Urs Schweizer
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: K13, K12, D62
Keywords: tort law, contract law, economic analysis of law
Abstract: While various liability rules of tort law provide efficient incentives to invest, breach remedies of contract law 
	are claimed to be distortive. Since, at least in Germany, obligations law provides general rules for both contractual 
	and tort relationships such discrepancy seems puzzling. The paper identifies a saddle point property as the driving 
	force behind most efficiency results and it establishes that fault rules of a general type generate this property. The 
	model is then confronted with important legal rules of the German law of obligations. The alleged inefficiency of 
	expectation damages turns out to rest, not on a failure of breach remedies, but on the binary nature of delivery 
	choice as imposed by the traditional analysis of contract law. 
Note: 
Length: 28
Creation-Date: 2004-02	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse2_2004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse2_2004