Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Optimal Trading Mechanisms for an Informed Seller
Author-Name: Rolf Tisljar
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C72, D82
Keywords: informed principal, mechanism design
Abstract: We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses 
	private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an undominated 
	perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model the seller gives the object to the person who values the object most, and receives a transfer payment from each 
	potential buyer such that all ex-ante expected rents are extracted from the buyers. 
Note: 
Length: 13
Creation-Date: 2002-11	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse33_2002.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse33_2002