Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem 
Author-Name: Matthias Kräkel
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: J31, J33 
Keywords: Strategic Delegation, Mergers, Oligopoly, Contests 
Abstract: This paper discusses the properties of stylized U.S. ("U-type") and Japanese tournaments ("J-type"), which can both solve the unverifiability problem 
	of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first-best efforts if workers are homogenous and risk neutral. 
	This result will no longer hold for J-type tournaments if the employer has all the bargaining power. However, if workers are rik averse or one worker has a 
	lead a J-type tournament may dominate a U-type tournament. 
Note: 
Length: 45
Creation-Date: 2002-01	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse3_2002.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse3_2002