Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets
Author-Name: Tibor Neugebauer
Author-Name: Reinhard Selten
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C12, C13, C72, C92, D44
Keywords: Experimental economics, first-price sealed-bid auctions, independent private value model, computerized competitors, bidding theory, risk aversion
Abstract: This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual 
	bidding behavior. Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computerized bids. Three treatments were considered which
	varied with the conditions of information feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently 
	reported. Our data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction experiments of 
	revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics. Finally we apply impulse 
	balance theory and make long run predictions of the individual bidding behavior. 
Note: 
Length: 29
Creation-Date: 2002-12	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse3_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse3_2003