Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives
Author-Name: Julia Nafziger
Author-Email: Julia.Nafziger@ulb.ac.be
Classification-JEL: D82, J31, J33, M12
Keywords: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, Job Assignments
Abstract: This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with
	the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments
	influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic
	motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement
	intrinsic
	motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the
	principal chooses an inefficient job assignment
	rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she
	can motivate him with monetary rewards. 
	This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated
	agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from
	incentive provision.
Note: 
Length: 21
Creation-Date: 2008-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse5_2008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse5_2008