Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Splitting Leagues
Author-Name: Matthias Kräkel
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: J3, J4, M5
Keywords: collusion, leagues, promotion, relegation, tournament
Abstract: Splitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents are homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative competition effect. However, it can be 
	shown that the principal can nevertheless benefit from splitting. First, splitting can be used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal to create additional 
	incentives when collusion among the agents is possible. Second, splitting leagues gives the principal the opportunity to introduce promotions and relegations 
	between nested tournaments (i.e., tournaments that are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives. 
Note: 
Length: 41
Creation-Date: 2003-04	
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse6_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse6_2003