Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Risk and Expected Utility Theory
Author-Name: Thomas Rieck
Author-Email: rieck@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D44, D82 
Keywords: Multi-object auction, multi-attribute auction, information revelation
Abstract: In multi-attribute procurement auctions with multiple objects, the auctioneer may
	care about the interplay of quality attributes that do not belong to the same item
	– like each item’s delivery time, if all items are needed at once. This can in?uence
	the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom
	ascending proxy auction to such an environment and show that the main properties
	still hold: Equilibria in pro?t-target strategies exist, the ?nal allocation maximizes
	the surplus and the payo? vector is in the core.
	Furthermore, the scoring rule used to evaluate the bids may contain valuable infor-
	mation about the auctioneer for his competitors, providing an incentive not to reveal
	it. In our setting, it is possible to keep the scoring rule secret without changing the
	outcome of the auction. Additionally, for additive scoring rules a close connection
	to the original proxy auction exists.
Note: 
Length: 22
Creation-Date: 2009-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse7_2009.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse7_2009