Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels
Author-Name: Jörg Oechssler
Classification-JEL: C72, L13
Keywords: cooperation
Abstract: It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the
	current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.
Note: 
Length: 6
Creation-Date: 2001-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse8_2001.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2001