Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Author-Name: Matthias Kräkel
Author-Email: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de 
Author-Name: Anja Schöttner
Author-Email: anja.schoettner@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D82; D86; J33
Keywords: bonuses; limited liability; minimum wages
Abstract: It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate
	positive worker rents and, consequently, ine?ciently low effort. We
	show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context.
	The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may
	exploit workers’ future rents to induce excessively high effort.
Note: 
Length: 11
Creation-Date: 2009-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse8_2009.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2009