Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Blowing the Whistle
Author-Name: José Apesteguia
Author-Name: Martin Dufwenberg
Author-Name: Reinhard Selten
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: C92, D43, L13
Keywords: Anti-trust, leniency, immunity, amnesty, blow the whistle, cartels,price competition, Bertrand model, experiment, communication
Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart 
	cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to 
	punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally. 
Note: 
Length: 34
Creation-Date: 2003-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse9_2003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2003