Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Experimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly Game
Author-Name: Sebastian J. Goerg
Author-Name: Reinhard Selten
Author-Email: sebastian.goerg@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C73, D43, C90
Keywords: cyclic game duopoly experiment, impulse balance equilibrium, two-sample equilibrium
Abstract: The notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wooders (2001). 
	They illustrate the concept by the analysis of a cyclic  duopoly
	game. The experiments reported concern this game. The game was played
	by eleven matching groups of six players each. The observed choice fre-
	quencies were compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, impulse
	balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink and Cox (2005), Selten and Chmura
	(2007)) and two-sample equilbrium (Osborne and Rubinstein(1998)). Pair-
	wise comparisons by the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test show that impulse
	balance equilibrium as well as two-sample equilibrium have a significantly
	better predictive success than Nash equilibrium. The difference between
	impulse balance equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium is not  
	significant.In each matching group three players acted only in uneven periods and  
	the other three only in even periods. This game has two pure strategy equi-
	libria in which both types of players behave differently. The data exhibit
	a weak but significant tendency in the direction of coordination at a  
	pure strategy equilibrium.
Note: 
Length: 22
Creation-Date: 2007-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse9_2007.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2007