Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Perfect Competition in an Oligoply (including Bilateral Monopoly)
Author-Name: Pradeep Dubey und Dieter Sondermann
Author-Email: Sondermann@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, D41, D44, D61
Keywords: Limit orders, double auction, Nash equilibria, Walras equilibria, mechanism design
Abstract: We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then
	strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield
	competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have
	competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute
	for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even
	in a bilateral monopoly.
Note: 
Length: 28
Creation-Date: 2008-05
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse9_2008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2008