Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Equilibrium selection in the spence signalling game
Author-Name: Werner Gueth
Author-Name: Eric van Damme
Author-WorkPlace-Name: Gueth:University of Frankfurt van Damme:University of Bonn
Classification-JEL: 
Abstract:  The paper studies the most simple version of the Spence job market
 signaling model in which there are just 2 types of workers while education
 is not productivity increasing. To eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria,
 the general equilibrium selection theory of John Harsanyi and Reinhard
 Selten is applied. It is shown that this theory selects Wilson's
 E2-equilibrium as the solution.
Keywords: Inferior strategies in the uniformly pertubed game, Spence job
  market,Equilibria
Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany
Creation-Date: 1989-01
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:218