Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Taxation as a Social Choice Problem, The Scope of the Laffer Argument
Author-Name: Roger Guesnerie
Author-Name: Michael Jerison
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Keywords: Laffer curve, tax equilibrium, social choice, optimal taxation
Abstract: This paper studies the form of the tax equilibrium set in simple 
 Diamond-Mirrlees models and characterizes the corresponding Laffer curves. 
 The curves need not ever slope downward and can have multiple local maxima. 
 Local information about them is thus not sufficient to place restrictions 
 on optimal choice among tax systems. In this simple framework, the problem 
 of choice among tax systems is shown to have no more structure than an 
 abstract social choice problem
Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany
Creation-Date: 1989-08
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:245