Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit
Author-Name: Erik van Damme
Author-Name: Reinhard Selten
Author-Name: Eyal Winter

Author-Postal: 
Author-Phone: 
Author-Homepage: 
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 
Abstract: In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies 
 determinateness of the 2-person bargaining problem. In this note we show 
 that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives 
 is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different 
 ways, (for example, because the pie is an amount of money and there is a 
 smallest money unit), any partition can be obtained as the result of a 
 subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers 
 is sufficiently small.
Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany

Length: 
Creation-Date: 1989-09
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:253