Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Linear Income Taxes: The Interaction Between State and Taxpayers
Author-Name: Hans Wiesmeth
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Keywords: Fiscal Theory, Microeconomic Theory
Abstract: In an economy with a finite population or with a finite number of 
 homogenous groups, taxpayers may either act competitively or react 
 strategically to a linear income tax schedule. Strategic reaction to the tax 
 policy of the government leads to an implementability problem for marginal 
 tax rates with subsequent consequences for feasible tax policies. Also, 
 effiency properties of the strategic solution are compared to those of the 
 competitive outcome. Strategic behaviour yields an increase in total income, 
 and, at least for small values of the marginal tax rate, a Pareto superior 
 allocation.
Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany
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Creation-Date: 1990-01
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:273