Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Switching Away From Probability One Beliefs
Author-Name: Georg Nöldeke
Author-Name: Eric van Damme

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Abstract: This paper considers a class of repeated signalling games to gain some 
 intuitive insights into the effects and the desirability of modelling players 
 in a dynamic game of incomplete information as being obstinate in the sense 
 that their beliefs satisfy a support restriction. We demonstrate that such 
 a restriction is rather dubious on a-priori grounds and in general imposes 
 "too much" pooling on sequential equilibrium outcomes. Equilibria violating 
 a support restriction should therefore not be dismissed in dynamic models 
 of incomplete information and may actually reflect the possibility of 
 reputation effects present in such a setting.
Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany

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Creation-Date: 1990-07
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:304