Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Cooperation in R and D - The Case of Patent Infringement Agreements
Author-Name: Sugata Marjit

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Classification-JEL: D45, L13
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Abstract: This paper is an attempt to provide a strategic rationale behind 
 patent infringement agreements (PIA). We interpret such agreements as yet 
 another form of cooperation in a non-cooperative environment. If the 
 infringement probability is not 'too' low, firms would have incentive to 
 sign a PIA sacrificing the right to punish the offender. In a simple 
 Cournot-Nash model with linear demand, we show that the infringement 
 probability as low as near 1/5 could induce PIA.
Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany

Length: 16 pages
Creation-Date: 1993-03
Revision-Date: 1993-09
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:419