Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: The Role of Tying Contracts for the Optimal Marketing of Durable Products
Author-Name: Ulrich Kamecke
Classification-JEL: L15, L42
Keywords: Tying contracts, price signals, antitrust policy
Abstract: Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential.
 This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts
 can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of
 asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product.
 The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements,
 the German Meto case and the US American SCM case.
Series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany
Length: 17 pages
Creation-Date: 1995-08
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:488