Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Incentives for information acquisition in firms
Author-Name: Heide C. U. Will
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of information acquisition in
  	the  light of two different organisational structures in various
  	competitive settings.  While the intuitive expectation that growing
  	uncertainty raises the incentives  to gather information can be
  	confirmed, a changing organisational structure may  also create a
  	comparative tradeoff. A move from nonintegration to integration
  	reflects less competition which tends to make information less
  	valuable.  Simultaneously, however, the decision power becomes more
  	concentrated, implying  that information is potentially more
  	important. We analyse the interdependencies  among organisational,
  	informational and market structures and their impact on  the
  	relative incentives for information acquisition.
Keywords: Information, organisational structure, Cournot oligopoly, product
  	differentiation
Classification-JEL: D23; D43; L11; L15
Creation-Date: 1996-02
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa519.ps
File-Format: Application/PostScript
File-Size: 29
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:519