Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Contingent Commodities and Implementation
Author-Name: Chattopadhyay, Subir 
Author-Name: Luis C. Corchon 
Author-Name: Jörg Naeve
Classification-JEL: D50
Keywords: Contingent Commodities, Implementation, Single-Crossing
Abstract: In this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity
     allocations can be used when the states are not directly
     contractible. In such a setting a contingent commodity
     allocation takes the form of a social choice function, and the
     question is whether this function is implementable
     (in the sense of full implementation). Using only very mild
     assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity
     allocations, we derive a strong negative result
     which also proves to be robust with respect to different
     solution concepts employed for implementation.
     These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation
     of Arrow-Debreu economies.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1998-04
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:572
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa572.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf