Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title: Contracts for Health Services: Quality Versus Excess Capacity
Author-Name: Boumls, Dieter 
Author-Name: Gianni De Fraja
Abstract: This paper studies the effects of non-contractability 
	of investment on the choices made by a health authority 
	and the hospital with which it contracts for the provision 
	of a specific service. We deal with a situation where the 
	parties must write a short-term contract, that is, where 
	they are prevented from signing a contract before making 
	their investment choices. For this reason inefficiency 
	emerges: the service quality chosen by the hospital 
	is too low, and the health authority relies too much on 
	outside providers.
Keywords: Health Services, Incomplete Contracts
Classification-JEL:  I11, I18
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1998-08
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:578